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Abstract—Optical networks are vulnerable to a range of
attacks targeting service disruption at the physical layer, such as
the insertion of harmful signals that can propagate through the
network and affect co-propagating channels. Detection of such
attacks and localization of their source, a prerequisite for secure
network operation, is a challenging task due to the limitations in
optical performance monitoring, as well as the scalability and cost
issues. In this paper, we propose an approach for localizing the
source of a jamming attack by modeling the worst-case scope
of each connection as a potential carrier of a harmful signal.
We define binary words called attack syndromes to model the
health of each connection at the receiver which, when unique,
unambiguously identify the harmful connection. To ensure attack
syndrome uniqueness, we propose an optimization approach to
design attack monitoring trails such that their number and length
is minimal. This allows us to use the optical network as a
sensor for physical-layer attacks. Numerical simulation results
indicate that our approach obtains network-wide attack source
localization at only 5.8% average resource overhead for the attack
monitoring trails.
Index Terms—optical network security, physical-layer attack
detection, attack monitoring trails.
I. INTRODUCTION
Optical networks are critical communication infrastructure
supporting a range of vital societal services and stakeholders.
As such, they can be a target of deliberate attacks aimed
at service disruption (SD) or eavesdropping by exploiting
the inherent vulnerabilities of the optical devices [1]. While
protection from eavesdropping relies on various methods
for encryption at different layers of the networking stack,
including the recent efforts in Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD) systems, service disruption attacks threatening the
advanced physical-layer paradigms, have not been adequately
addressed so far. A plethora of physical-layer SD attack
methods differs in terms of their level of sophistication, ease
of implementation, damaging effects, their scope, extent, and
persistence, ease of discovery, etc. For example, fiber cuts
are relatively straightforward to implement, they affect all
connections traversing the cut link, with the effect confined
to that link, and are easy to discover.
One of the most harmful attack methods identified in the
literature is power jamming. It is performed by inserting a
harmful signal of excessive power into the fiber (e.g., by bend-
ing it [2]), which reduces the amount of gain allocated to co-
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propagating optical channels and aggravates the physical-layer
impairments in the fiber. The damaging effects of this attack
technique are not necessarily confined to the primarily intruded
link but may propagate through the network. Combined with
the lack of accurate attack models, as well as limited avail-
ability of physical-layer information due to the high cost and
sparse placement of Optical Performance Monitoring (OPM)
devices, identification and source localization of attacks at the
optical layer is very challenging.
Recent advancements in commercially available coherent
receivers that provide a rich set of OPM parameters to
the Network Management System (NMS), paired with the
proliferation of machine learning (ML) techniques, enable a
breakthrough in physical-layer security management. Instead
of relying on strategic deployment of OPM devices to help
localize security breaches, which is expensive and unscal-
able, attack management can now leverage the ample OPM
information obtained from the receivers at the destination of
each connection, where they need to be detected anyway. This
extensive set of OPM data can then be exhaustively analysed
by applying ML techniques which allow to identify intricate
relationships among the various parameters under different
security regimes.
In our previous work, we have experimentally investigated
the detection of harmful signals to identify signatures of
jamming attacks of varying intensities. To this end, we de-
veloped machine learning approaches based on supervised [3]
and unsupervised learning [4], that analyzed the OPM data
obtained for a particular connection, and identified whether it
has been affected by a jamming attack. The approaches based
on supervised learning were able to achieve 100% accuracy
in attack identification [3], while previously unseen (zero-day)
attack scenarios were detected in up to 92% of occurrences [4].
In spite of the favorable performance of these approaches
for detecting disruption at the connection level, localizing the
source of a harmful signal at the network level requires a
network-wide approach.
To this end, we propose an approach for network security
diagnostics based on correlating the health of multiple con-
nections upon their detection at the receiver and localizing the
attack source according to the subset of degraded connections.
We focus on the worst-case jamming attacks where we assume
that any individual connection can carry a jamming signal,
which can then affect the co-propagating connections along its
entire physical path (i.e., there is no mechanism of thwarting
the harmful signal propagation). This allows us to provide a
general model for localizing the source of a harmful signal,
which can easily be adapted to more specific cases by fine-
tuning the assumptions. The scope of the damage from a
jamming signal is modeled by defining binary words which
we refer to as attack syndromes. Attack syndromes, if unique,
provide a way of using the network as a sensor capable of
diagnosing the security status of the network and identifying
the harmful connection. To support such functionality, we
develop an approach for generating unique attack syndromes
in the network by sparse addition of attack monitoring probes
such that their number and length is minimal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II overviews the related work. Section III explains the
concept of proposed attack syndromes, their significance and
formation. The problem of designing attack monitoring trails
that ensure unique attack syndromes is formulated as an
integer linear program in Section IV. Section V evaluates
the performance of the proposed approach, while Section VI
outlines the remaining challenges and concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Studies [5]–[7] focus on the detection of jamming attacks.
In [5], the authors leverage alarms raised by the network
components. Binary trees are formed based on the established
channels and the deployed devices to reduce the time needed
to analyze an alarm received by the centralized NMS. In [6],
another centralized approach is proposed, relying on mon-
itors and diagnostic lightpaths to improve attack detection
efficiency. A distributed approach from [7] detects jamming
attacks by tracking power levels of each connection at every
port of each node in the network and forwarding the diagnostic
procedure upstream until the source node of the harmful
signal is located. The effectiveness of these procedures heavily
depends on the assumptions of a particular attack method (e.g.,
monitoring only power to detect power jamming). Moreover,
alarming the components for all types of attacks is costly,
while monitoring all signals at all ports is expensive and
unscalable. A mechanism based on constant sensing and re-
porting of numerous individual active monitors does not scale
well with the size and the agility of future optical networks.
In addition, such procedures increase the NMS complexity
and stress the limited capability of network processing units,
as the total amount of monitored information and signalling
grows linearly with the number and size of network elements,
and the number of connections. Therefore, we propose an
approach that leverages only the information about connection
health available at the receiver to form attack syndromes, while
sparsely adding attack monitoring trails to resolve potential
syndrome ambiguity.
The concept of monitoring trails has been thoroughly in-
vestigated in the context of link failure detection. In [8], the
authors applied information theory to derive a tight lower
bound on the minimum number of probes per network edge
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Fig. 1. An illustrative example with unique attack syndromes for all
connections.
needed for failure diagnostics. The optimal design of mo-
nitoring trails using Integer Linear Programming (ILP) for
single-link failures was presented in [9]. [10]–[12] proposed
monitoring trail design to detect shared risk link group (SRLG)
failures. While these approaches enable cost-efficient detection
of failures of single or multiple geographically correlated links,
our approach is concerned of detecting harmful connections
that can traverse multiple links and affect different connections
along their paths, requiring a connection-based approach.
III. ATTACK SYNDROMES FOR UNAMBIGUOUS
LOCALIZATION OF AN ATTACK SOURCE
The main idea of the proposed approach for attack source
localization is to model the mutual attacking relations among
the connections in the network, and deduce the source of
an attack based on the subset of connections registered as
degraded upon an attack occurrence. We use a simple example
shown in Fig. 1 depicting a network with 6 nodes (A to F)
and 4 connections (c1 to c4) to explain the basic concepts
and structures used in the proposed approach. The attacking
relations among connections are modeled using an attack
graph (AG) and the corresponding attack diagnostic matrix A.
Each connection ci in the network is represented by an AG
node. The AG element ci is adjacent to all other connections
cj that are affected in case ci carries a harmful signal.
The dimensions of the attack diagnostic matrix A match
the number of connections in the network. Element A[i, j]
is equal to 1 if a harmful signal inserted on connection ci
can affect connection cj (i.e., if they are adjacent in AG),
and 0 otherwise. In this way, row i represents the binary
attack syndrome (AS) of connection ci. If the syndromes are
unique, when NMS receives alarms reporting degradation of
connections cj that are adjacent to ci in the AG, the received
attack syndrome will match the one of ci, which will identify
ci as the harmful connection. This is the case for the attack
syndromes of all connections shown in Fig. 1.
However, attack syndromes of different individual connec-
tions can match and, hence, fail to provide unambiguous attack
localization. Fig. 2(a) illustrates such a scenario using the
same network topology as in Fig. 1, and a different set of
connections. As can be seen in the attack matrix, the attack
syndromes of connections {c1, c2, c3} are identical, as well
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Fig. 2. An illustrative example with ambiguous attack syndromes (a), resolved by adding two attack monitoring trails T1 and T2 (b).
as those of {c4, c5}. We refer to the set of connections with
matching attack syndromes as a Cluster of Ambiguous Attack
Syndromes (CLAS). As can be seen from the attack graph in
Fig. 2(a), there are two CLASes, denoted with ϑ1 and ϑ2, and
connections inside each CLAS form a clique (not necessarily
maximal) in the AG. In general, a CLAS may be a part of
a larger clique in the AG, where the attack syndromes of the
CLAS non-members are differentiated due to their adjacency
to other connections outside of the clique.
Attack syndrome disambiguation can be aided through
judicious resource assignment, aimed at avoiding the creation
of CLASes, minimizing their number or size [13]. However,
such approaches cannot guarantee complete elimination of
CLASes as a prerequisite for unambiguous identification of
harmful connections. Therefore, we propose an approach for
adding attack monitoring trails in the network which guarantee
to break the ambiguity of indistinguishable attack syndromes,
while minimizing the number and the length of added trails.
The example in Fig. 2(b) illustrates how to resolve attack
syndrome ambiguity through sparse addition of dedicated
attack monitoring trails. In general, in order to distinguish
among attack syndromes of |ϑ| connections in CLAS ϑ,
dlog2|ϑ|e distinguishing bits need to be added to their re-
spective attack sydromes, i.e., we need to probe dlog2|ϑ|e
individual network links. Any link to be probed for AS
disambiguation needs to be traversed by one up to |ϑ| − 1
connections from the CLAS ϑ (otherwise it does not provide
any extra information about the harmful connection). For the
example in Fig. 2(b), disambiguation of CLAS ϑ1 requires
probing dlog2|ϑ1|e = dlog23e = 2 links (candidate links: A-B
and C-F), while disambiguation of CLAS ϑ2 requires probing
dlog2|ϑ2|e = dlog21e = 1 link (candidates: F-E and D-A).
In order to be resource-efficient, the total number of attack
monitoring trails in the network, as well as their length, should
be minimized. Therefore, each trail should traverse multiple
individual links selected for probing. When deciding which
candidate links to select for probing, and how to establish the
attack monitoring trails over those links, two main constraints
must be taken into account:
• The binary suffixes formed by the bits added to the attack
syndromes of connections in the same CLAS by the
established attack monitoring trails must be unique, and
• A monitoring trail should not include multiple candidate
links intended to break attack syndrome ambiguity of
connections in the same CLAS.
A feasible solution with two attack monitoring trails, de-
noted as T1 and T2 is shown in Fig. 2(b). T1 is a multi-link
trail that traverses link D-A to disambiguate the syndromes of
connections in CLAS ϑ1, and link A-B to disambiguate the
syndromes in CLAS ϑ2. As there are 3 connections in ϑ2,
link C-F is used for trail T2. The suffixes added by T1 and
T2 in the attack matrix in Fig. 2(b) are shown in bold. In the
next section, we present an ILP for the establishment of attack
monitoring trails that ensure unique attack syndromes and,
hence, unambiguous identification of the harmful connection,
while minimizing the number and the length of the trails.
IV. DESIGN OF PROBING TRAILS FOR ATTACK
LOCALIZATION
A. Problem Definition
Given is a physical network topology and a set of routed
optical connections. The network topology is modeled as a
graph G=(V, E), where V denotes a set of vertices representing
network nodes, and E denotes a set of edges, representing
directed network links. The set of routed optical connections
is denoted as C, where each connection c ∈ C traverses a
set of links Pc along its path from the source node sc to the
destination node dc. Based on the assignment of resources to
the connections, the mutual attacking relations among them
are identified a priori and given in form of an attack graph
and a corresponding attack matrix, that allows for derivation
of the attack syndromes. Consequently, the set of Clusters of
Ambiguous Attack Syndromes (CLASes), denoted with Θ,
is also given. Our objective is to set up attack monitoring
trails in the network which will ensure disambiguation among
matching attack syndromes of the connections in such a way
that the number and the length of the added trails is minimal.
To do so, we must first determine the individual links in the
network whose probing enables attack syndrome disambigua-
tion, followed by the routing of the attack monitoring trails
over the links identified in the previous step.
B. ILP Formulation
Input parameters
• G(V, E): a directed graph where V is the set of vertices
that represent the network nodes, and E is the set of arcs
that represent the network links. Each link e is defined
by its source node oe and destination node te;
• C: a set of connections, where each connection c ∈ C is
defined by its source node sc, destination node dc and
physical route pic;
• Φ: connection routing, where φce is equal to 1 if connec-
tion c traverses link e;
• Θ: a set of CLASes. Each CLAS ϑ ∈ Θ comprises
connections that have matching attack syndromes. In
order to disambiguate the attack syndromes of lightpaths
in CLAS ϑ, dlog2|ϑ|e links need to be probed;
• F : probe-CLAS mapping matrix, where Fϑ,p is equal to
1 if probing link p contributes to the disambiguation of
attack syndromes for CLAS ϑ.
• H: probe-connection mapping matrix, where Hc,p is
equal to 1 if probing link p contributes to the disam-
biguation of the attack syndrome for connection c;
• P: set of links that need to be probed, and may be
concatenated into attack monitoring trails;
• T : set of attack monitoring trails, |T | initiated to |P|;
• M : a large constant, set to 1000.
Variables
• αcp ∈ {0, 1}: equal to 1 if a harmful signal carried by
connection c ∈ C can affect probed link p ∈ P , and 0
otherwise;
• αc,pe ∈ {0, 1}: equal to 1 if connection c uses link e which
matches probe p, and 0 otherwise;
• βtp ∈ {0, 1}: equal to 1 if attack monitoring trail t ∈ T
encompasses probed link p, and 0 otherwise;
• γpe ∈ {0, 1}: equal to 1 if probed link p matches link
e ∈ E , and 0 otherwise;
• γte ∈ {0, 1}: equal to 1 if attack monitoring trail t
traverses link e ∈ E , and 0 otherwise;
• δtv ∈ {0, 1}: equal to 1 if node v ∈ V is the source node
of trail t, and 0 otherwise;
• δ
t
v ∈ {0, 1}: equal to 1 if node v is the destination node
of trail t, and 0 otherwise;
• t,pe ∈ {0, 1}: equal to 1 if probed link p encompassed
by trail t matches link e, and 0 otherwise;
• t,pe ∈ {0, 1}: equal to 1 if probed link p matches link e,
but is not encompassed by t, and 0 otherwise;
• ηt ∈ {0, 1}: equal to 1 if trail t is active;
• ∆c ∈ Z+: decimal representation of the connection c’s
attack syndrome suffix formed by added probes;
• xtp, z
t
p, y
t
p ∈ {0, 1}: control variables;
Objective function
Minimize
∑
t∈T
ηt +
∑
t∈T
γte (1)
The objective of the approach is to minimize the total
number of attack monitoring trails established in the network,
and their total length in terms of link count.
Constraints
∆c =
∑
p
10p · αcp ·Hc,p, ∀c ∈ C. (2)
Constraint (2) calculates the decimal value of the attack
syndrome binary suffix formed by the probed links.
∆c 6= ∆d, ∀c, d ∈ C : c, d ∈ ϑ, c 6= d. (3)
Constraint (3) ensures distinctive attack syndrome suffixes of
any two connections c and d in the same CLAS ϑ.
αc,pe = φ
c
e · γpe , ∀c ∈ C,∀p ∈ P,∀e ∈ E . (4)
M · αcp ≥
∑
e∈E
αc,pe , ∀c ∈ C,∀p ∈ P . (5)
αcp ≤
∑
e∈E
αc,pe , ∀c ∈ C,∀p ∈ P . (6)
Constraints (4)-(6) ensure that probed link p is marked as
affected by connection c if they share any common link e.∑
t∈T
βtp ≥ 1, ∀p ∈ P . (7)
M · ηt ≥
∑
p∈P
βtp, ∀t ∈ T . (8)
βtp ≤ ηt, ∀p ∈ P,∀t ∈ T . (9)
βtp + β
t
r ≤ 2− Fϑ,p · Fϑ,r, ∀t ∈ T , (10)
∀ϑ ∈ Θ,∀p, r ∈ P : Fϑ,p = Fϑ,r = 1, p 6= r.
Constraints (7)-(9) make sure that each probed link is included
in an active attack monitoring trail. Constraint (10) guarantees
that two probed links p and r which are used for disambigua-
tion of attack syndromes within the same CLAS ϑ are not
included in the same trail.∑
v∈V
δtv = η
t, ∀t ∈ T . (11)∑
v∈V
δ
t
v = η
t, ∀t ∈ T . (12)
δtv + δ
t
v ≤ 1, ∀t ∈ T ,∀v ∈ V . (13)
Constraints (11)-(13) assign a source and a destination node
to each active trail t.
t,pe = γ
p
e ∧ βtp, ∀T ∈ T ,∀p ∈ P,∀e ∈ E . (14)
t,pe = γ
p
e ∧ (1− βtp), ∀t ∈ T ,∀p ∈ P,∀e ∈ E . (15)
Constraints (14) and (15) model the relation between trail t
and probe p that matches link e. Symbol ∧ represents the
logical AND operation in a compact form. Relation a = b ∧ c
is linearized as a ≥ b+ c− 1; a ≤ b; a ≤ c.
M · γte ≥
∑
p∈P
t,pe , ∀t ∈ T ,∀e ∈ E . (16)
M · (1− γte) ≥
∑
p∈P
t,pe , ∀t ∈ T ,∀e ∈ E . (17)
γte ≤ ηt, ∀t ∈ T ,∀e ∈ E . (18)
Constraints (16) and (17) model the dependency of the attack
monitoring trail routing on the arrangement of probed links
which they include or exclude. According to (16), trail t must
traverse link e if there exists a probe p which matches e and is
included in t. Correspondingly, t is not allowed to traverse link
e if it is used by probe p that is excluded from t. Constraint
(18) ensures that only active trails use links.∑
e∈E:v=oe
γte −
∑
e∈E:v=te
γte − 1 +M · xtv ≥ 0, (19)
∀t ∈ T ,∀v ∈ V .
δtv ≤M · (1− xtV ), ∀t ∈ T ,∀v ∈ V . (20)∑
e∈E:v=te
γte −
∑
e∈E:v=oe
γte − 1 +M · ytv ≥ 0, (21)
∀t ∈ T ,∀v ∈ V .
δ
t
v ≤M · (1− ytv), ∀t ∈ T ,∀v ∈ V . (22)∑
e∈E:v=oe
γte −
∑
e∈E:v=te
γte +M · ztv ≥ 0, (23)
∀t ∈ T ,∀v ∈ V .
1− δtv ∧ δ
t
v ≤M · (1− ztv), ∀t ∈ T ,∀v ∈ V . (24)
Constraints (19)-(24) ensure flow conservation of attack mo-
nitoring trails. Constraints (19) and (20) relate to the source
node of trail t. If node v is the source of t, i.e., δtv=1, then the
control variable xtv in (20) takes on the value of 0, forcing the
number of outgoing links from node v carrying t to be greater
than the number of incoming links. Similar observations apply
to constraints (21)- (22) and (23) -(24) which relate to the
destination node and the intermediate nodes of t, respectively.
Assuming |T | is upper-bounded by |P|, which is in turn
upper-bounded by log2|C|, the number of variables is upper-
bounded by |V|D(|C|log2|C| + log22 |C|), where D is the
maximum nodal degree. The number of constraints is upper-
bounded by |C|2 + log22 |C|(VDC + log2|C|).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of the proposed approach in
terms of the generated CLASes and the resources needed for
attack diagnostics. The ILP was implemented in Optimization
Programming Language (OPL) and solved with CPLEX v12.8
running on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux workstation with
16-cores Intel Xeon processor and 64 GB of RAM. The
investigated topologies, shown in Fig. 3, were a dummy
network with 6 nodes and 18 unidirectional links (Fig. 3(a)),
Polish network with 12 nodes and 36 links [14] (Fig. 3(b)),
and the NSF network with 14 nodes and 42 links (Fig. 3(c)).
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Fig. 3. Test topologies used in simulations: (a) 6-node dummy network, (b)
Polish network, and (c) NSF network.
For each topology, we considered a low, medium and high
traffic load, by randomly generating uniformly distributed
traffic matrices with {2, 3, 5} connection requests per node
for the 6-node network, {4, 6, 11} for the Polish, and {5,
7, 13} for the NSF network, respectively. The requests were
routed over the shortest physical path, the resulting CLASes
were extracted using a C++ script, and fed to the ILP solver.
The reported results are averaged over 10 traffic matrices.
To illustrate the need for attack syndrome disambiguation,
Fig. 4(a) shows the percentage of connections whose attack
syndromes are not unique. For the 6-node and the Polish
12-node network, attack syndromes of 23% connections on
average are ambiguous, while this value for the NSF network
is 12%. The percentage of AS-ambiguous connections in the
6-node and Polish network decreases for higher loads, which
can be explained by a greater number of diverse connections
disambiguating each other’s syndromes. The average number
of CLASes and their respective size are shown in Fig. 4(b)
and (c), respectively. The number of CLASes in the 6-node
network ranges between 1 and 2, while the Polish and the NSF
network test cases have between 3 and 4.9 CLASes. The 6-
node and the NSF network have between 2 and 3 connections
in each CLAS (denoted with the error bars in Fig. 4(c)), while
the maximum CLAS size in the Polish network equals 4,
yielding an average CLAS size of just above 2 for all networks.
The number of links which must be probed in order to
resolve the ambiguity of the attack syndromes is shown in
Fig. 5(a). For the 6-node network, probing on average 1.8
links over all scenarios provides the necessary distinguishable
suffixes in the attack syndromes of the connections inside each
CLAS. In the Polish and the NSF network, on average 5.6
and 4 links need to probed, respectively. If we assume that
only single-link monitoring probes are applied, i.e., there is no
concatenation of the probing links into attack monitoring trails,
probing each link would require one pair of transponders, and
the number of probing links would translate into the number of
necessary transponder pairs. Concatenating the probing links
into monitoring trails reduces this cost. As shown in Fig. 5(b),
our approach requires 1.5, 2.87, and 2.3 attack monitoring
trails on average for the three networks, respectively. Es-
tablishing multi-link monitoring trails reduces the respective
number of necessary transponder pairs by 15.2%, 49.1%, and
44%. The hop count of the established trails is shown in
Fig. 5(c). On average over all test cases, attack monitoring
trails traverse 2.09, 3.8, and 3.1 links in the 6-node, Polish, and
NSF network, respectively. The trails incurred a resource usage
overhead of 9.45%, 5.72% and 2.25% for the three networks,
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Fig. 4. The percentage of connections with ambiguous attack syndromes (a), the number or CLASes in the network (b), and their size (c).
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Fig. 5. The number of individual links that need to be probed to resolve attack syndrome ambiguity (a), the number of attack monitoring trails established
over those links (b), and the trail length (c).
respectively, or 5.8% on average over all instances. For the
6-node network, the ILP was solved in less than 1 s, while
the average running times for the Polish and the NSF network
were 32.8 s and 28.9 s, respectively.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper investigated scalable and resource-efficient lo-
calization of harmful connections inserted in the network with
the goal of disrupting co-propagating optical channels. The
proposed approach is based on leveraging OPM data available
from the receivers and forming binary attack syndromes that
reflect the health of each connection. To ensure the attack syn-
dromes are unique, which is essential for correct identification
of the harmful connection, we developed an ILP for sparse
addition of attack monitoring probes of minimal number and
length. The simulation results indicate that complete attack
syndrome disambiguation can be achieved at only a minor
resource overhead for the probes. For future work, we plan
to investigate diagnostics of a broader range of attacks with
different effects, while also incorporating the uncertainty of
ML approaches in the detection of connection degradation
caused by attacks. To enhance the scalability of the framework,
low-complexity heuristic solutions will be developed.
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